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Showing Its Teeth: The International
Criminal Court Takes On Child
Conscription in the Congo, But Is Its Bark
Worse Than Its Bite?
Justin Coleman*
I. Introduction
Imagine living with your family in a country that has been gripped
by a violent war for several years. The war has exhausted the country's
resources and depleted its population through the slaughter of hundreds
of thousands of civilians and soldiers. Until now, you have protected
your thirteen-year-old daughter and ten-year-old son from the violence
surrounding them, but one night that all changes. While you and your
children sleep, several soldiers enter your home, point guns at your
family, and take your children into the night. Your children have been
forcibly recruited to contribute to the war effort as child soldiers.
You learn your children have been taken to a military encampment
to undergo training and initiation. Here your daughter catches the eye of
a commanding officer. The officer decides to take her as one of his
wives or mistresses as he has done with numerous other girls. As a
result, she is sexually assaulted several times and will likely become
pregnant before she is fourteen. Additionally, your daughter is
responsible for contributing to the war effort in other ways, including
manual labor (e.g., cooking and carrying supplies). Later, your pregnant
daughter may even be armed and forced to kill.
Your son, even at the age of ten, will not be spared the harsh
treatment. Initially, the militants force him to take various drugs to lower
his inhibitions and make his mind easier to mold. They systematically
beat him in order to harden him for the life as a soldier. Next, he is
forced to kill someone close to him or from his community. In order to
further desensitize your son to war-time violence, he is required to take
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part in other forms of cruel behavior, including killing civilians, raping
women and girls, and beating other captured children.
Atrocities like these occur everyday in all parts of the world-
especially in Africa, and are particularly problematic in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo ("Congo"). These terrible crimes have happened
to countless children in the Congo, just as they happened to Fabrice,
Jeanne, and Lambert.
Fabrice was ten, and in the sixth grade when soldiers killed his
parents.' He was abducted shortly thereafter, trained, armed with a
weapon, and told to avenge them.2 Fabrice saw combat on multiple
fronts before he reached the age of thirteen.3
Jeanne was eleven when she was abducted while on her way home
from school.4 She explained her "recruitment" like this:
I came across some soldiers who were pretending to mend their
broken down vehicle, but in fact it was a ploy. They called me and
some other children over, and when we went up to them, they
grabbed me, threw me into their vehicle and took me off to a training
centre. I was trained there and then we began the march towards
Kinshasa.5
Even now, Jeanne has no knowledge of what became of her parents.6
For Lambert, age twelve, the recruiters came right through his front
door: "I was taken from my home... . I was with my young sister, my
cousin and my mother, who died after some days because of what the
soldiers did to her .... My young sister couldn't [follow] because she
was sick, so they raped her and left her., 7 The soldiers took Lambert and
trained him to torture and kill.8
For Fabrice, Jeanne, Lambert, and hundreds of thousands of
children like them, violence is their reality. It is for these children that
the International Criminal Court ("ICC") takes action. In its fourth year,
the ICC has started its first trial, which specifically targets child
conscription in the Congo. 9 The Court charged a Congolese warlord
1. See REDRESS, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes?: Child Soldiers before the




4. See Amnesty Int'l, Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Al Index:




7. REDRESS, supra note 1, at 18.
8. See id.
9. See STEPHANIE HANSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AFRICA AND THE
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with using child soldiers during that country's civil war.1°
This Comment focuses on child conscription in the Congo, which
the ICC began investigating in March 2006." Specifically, this
Comment analyzes the ICC's first case, against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
("Lubanga"). First, this Comment defines child conscription in Section
II and looks at the various ways it has occurred and continues to occur in
the world. Subsection A addresses the when, where, and how child
soldiers are used, as well as reasons behind the widespread practice of
this war crime. Subsection B turns to a description of the Congo and the
child conscription practices that have occurred there. Additionally, the
development and treatment of child conscription under international law
is included. Subsection D focuses on the ICC as created by the Rome
Statute.
Next, Section III analyzes the ICC's first case: The Prosecutor v.
Lubanga.12 This section includes a description of Lubanga's criminal
conduct with regards to child conscription. Additionally, an analysis of
the advantages and disadvantages associated with this case is discussed.
This Comment suggests possible ways to deal with some of the issues the
ICC has faced in Lubanga's case. Finally, this Comment concludes that
despite the many concerns, it is important that prosecution of Lubanga
for the crime of child conscription continues in the ICC.
II. Background
A. What is Child Conscription?
Child conscription involves the use of children in any armed
conflict. 13 Individuals under the age of adulthood, normally eighteen,
14
may be considered "children" for purposes of child conscription.' 5
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12048/africa-and




12. Situation in the Dem. Rep. Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, Warrant of Arrest, ICC-01/04-01/06, Feb. 10, 2006 [hereinafter
Warrant].
13. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
(July 17, 1998), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjoumall
RomeStatute_120704-EN.pdf [hereinafter Rome Statute].
14. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/54/263, 2 (May 25, 2000), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/NOO/625/67/PDF/N0062567.pdj?OpenElement (last visited Mar. 28, 2008)
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
15. See Optional Protocol, supra note 14, at 2.
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However, the term conscription is more typically attributed to those
individuals who are under the age of fifteen. 16 Many military groups and
organizations engage in the use of child soldiers, 17 (soldiers under the
age of fifteen) including government armed forces, 8 paramilitary
groups,19 guerrilla operations, and other "armed opposition groups. 2°
The use of child soldiers has taken place and continues to take place
in over thirty countries, primarily in war-zones. 2' Currently, children are
being used as soldiers in nearly thirty-three conflicts around the world.
22
Furthermore, nearly 300,000 children have been involved in military
operations worldwide, both voluntarily and involuntarily. 23  These
conflicts have included children as young as the age of nine who have
been recruited to fight by military organizations.24
Military recruiters in war-torn regions employ various tactics in
order to obtain child soldiers. Normally force is the tool of choice. Any
choice that a child may have regarding armed conflict is eliminated when
they are forced to join. Military groups will often grab children right off
of the street,25 or any place they can be found2 6  These children are
forced to comply with every instruction given to them under threat of
violence to themselves or those close to them.27
While many children are forced into military service, several join
voluntarily.28  However, it is questionable how any child in these
situations could make a "voluntary" choice.29 Often, these children's
countries have been ravaged by war, and because of this destruction the
16. Id.
17. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Fact Sheet, http://www.child-




21. See Hearings on U.S. Ratification of the Optional Protocols to the Convention of
the Rights of the Child Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 107th Cong. (2002),
(testimony of Jo Becker) available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/03/
childsoldiers0307.htm [hereinafter Hearings].
22. See Jo Becker, Child Soldiers: Changing a Culture of Violence, 32 WTR HUM.
RTS. 16, (2005).
23. See Hearings, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, War is not Child's Play! International Law and the
Prohibition of Children's Involvment in Armed Conflicts, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J.
57, 59 (2006).
26. Id.
27. See Hearings, supra note 21.
28. See Human Rights Watch, Children's Rights: Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!,
http://hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter
Children's Rights].
29. See Hearings, supra note 21.
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basic functions of society have broken down around them.3° With their
communities breaking down, children turn to military groups for
survival3' because they offer the security and stability lacking in their
lives. 32 Homeless children who are without their families are especially
drawn to that promise of stability.33 An extreme level of anxiety
contributes to their willingness to join the armed conflicts that surround
them as a large majority of these children lack access to education, jobs,
shelter, supervision, and food sources.34 However, most child volunteers
lack a basic understanding of the battle they join35 and are unable to
formulate a rational decision with regard to the conflict.3 6 For those
young combatants, there is no other clear means of meeting their basic
needs.
Still, some children join the fight for other reasons. Violence
becomes a perpetuating cycle as some youths join the fight in order to
avenge the deaths of family members.37 Many young military recruits
join after witnessing, first hand, the torture or murder of loved ones. 8
Other reasons, including social pressure and a sense of adventure,
influence the decision to join for some children.
39
Regardless of whether children used in warfare are there voluntarily
or involuntarily, they tend to come from similar backgrounds. Children
from upper class families are generally not involved in the conflicts.4°
Instead poor, uneducated, and disadvantaged children fill out the military
ranks. 41 The recruiters in these conflicts are not selective about the




32. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldier Use 2003: A
Briefing for the 4th UN. Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict
(2004), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/childsoldiers0104/childsoldiers.pdf (last
visited Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Security Council Briefing].
33. Id.
34. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General:
Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, delivered to the General Assembly, 41 U.N. Doc.
A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/51/
plenary/a51-306.htm [hereinafter Expert Report].
35. See Tiffany A. Richards, The War Is Over but the Battle Has Just Begun:
Enforcing a Child's Right to Education in the Wake ofArmed Conflict, 23 PENN ST. INT'L
L. REv. 203, 205-06 (2004).
36. Id.
37. See Children's Rights, supra note 28.
38. See Security Council Briefing, supra note 32, at 3.
39. See Udombana, supra note 25, at 64.
40. Id.
41. See Stephanie H. Bald, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court
of Sierra Leone Find Justice For Its Children?, 18 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 537, 547 (2002).
42. See Children's Rights, supra note 28.
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There are a few key reasons why military commanders increasingly
turn to children to populate their armies. When conflicts are drawn out,
causing high numbers of casualties, child soldiers fill a pressing need for
manpower.43 In turn, both sides of the conflict turn to the conscription of
children in order to carry on the battle. 4
Children are easily obtained and widely used as soldiers by military
groups.45 Today's wars take place away from traditional "battlefields,"
which are typically outside of population centers.46 Instead, these battles
are occurring in the heart of urban neighborhoods.47 Subsequently,
recruiters are placed in a prime location to snatch prospective "soldiers"
from traditional safe places, such as schools and playgrounds.48
Military leaders believe children make good soldiers because they
are considered "more obedient, do not question orders and are easier to
manipulate than adult soldiers., 49 Furthermore, children have a sense of
fearlessness commanders can exploit in battle by putting them in the
front lines. 50
Many children are subjected to atrocious acts while being initiated
into the ranks of armed forces. At times, such acts consist of killing
family members or someone they know in order to dissolve all outside
ties.51  This keeps the children firmly under the army's control.
Moreover, children are forced to commit or partake in further acts of
violence, including "beheadings, amputations, rape, and the burning of
people alive. 3 Most child soldiers are given drugs, such as marijuana
and cocaine, during this process to further manipulate their minds and
decrease their inhibition.54  Through such acts, children become
desensitized to violence and transform into brutal and hardened soldiers
to carry out further orders.55
There is no end to the list of jobs awaiting child soldiers after the
initiation process. Children are not only used as traditional soldiers, but
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Lighter Weapons Help to Create Armies of Children Ready for Combat,
Report Says: Higher Minimum Age for Recruitment Is Sought, BALTIMORE SuN, Jan. 11,
1999, at 8A.
46. See Jimmy Cai-ter, Kid Soldiers a War's Most Tragic Victim, USA TODAY, June
30, 1998, at I IA.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Expert Report, supra note 34, at 15.
50. See id.
51. See Hearings, supra note 2 1.
52. Id.
53. Udombana, supra note 25, at 63.
54. See David Ott, Under Age and Under Arms, THE HERALD, Jan. 12, 1999, at 11
(revealing that leaders give boys drugs to make them more efficient killers).
55. See id. at 64.
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also to fill other military needs (e.g. labor, intelligence gathering,
scouting, assassination, and sexual slavery). 6 Often times, child soldiers
are given lighter jobs at first, such as cooking or running messages. 7
Eventually, most children end up on the front lines and participate in
some of the heaviest fighting.58
Today, children can take the place of traditional adult soldiers like
never before due to advancements in technology. 59  High-powered
assault weapons are lightweight and simple to operate. 60  Because of
their ease of operation, semi-automatic weapons can be carried and used
with deadly accuracy by small children.61 However, due largely to their
inexperience, child soldiers tend to suffer higher casualty rates in battle
than adults.62 They are commonly ordered into unexplored areas, such as
minefields, ahead of adult soldiers and are even used for "suicide
missions. ''63 Moreover, children have been used as first-strike troops for
ambush assaults because of their relative fearlessness.
64
The conscription of girls creates another realm of abuses. Female
recruits are often used in the same roles as boys, but additionally endure
various forms of sexual abuse committed against them. 65  Military
leaders can take the young girls as their wives whenever they choose.6 6
Human Rights Watch learned of one instance in Uganda where a girl
gave birth to her commander's baby and was then forced into battle
while the baby was tied to her back.67 Moreover, many girls are made
sex slaves and forced into prostitution. 68 Military groups even solicit
females with the intention to use them as wives for their male soldiers.
69
Child conscription has a devastating effect on the children
compelled to fight. Severe physical injury is likely even if the children
survive combat.70 Children placed in the thick of battle receive gunshot
wounds,7 ' lose arms and legs,72 and sustain major psychological trauma,
56. See Udombana, supra note 25, at 64.
57. See Hearings, supra note 21.
58. Id.




63. Hearings, supra note 21.
64. Expert Report, supra note 34, at 17.
65. See Fact Sheet, supra note 17.
66. See Children's Rights, supra note 28.
67. Id.
68. See UNICEF, War Hits Home When it Hits Women and Girls, available at
http://www.unicef.org/graca/women.htm (last visited Jan. 2007).
69. Id.
70. See Udombana, supra note 25, at 59.
71. See Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: Children at War, Al
Index: AFR 62/034/2003 (2003), available at http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
trauma that haunts them for life.7 3 Many children who are unable to
avoid military service are uneducated,74 unemployed,75 and homeless.76
Subsequently, even those children who break away from military life
often remain violent and are easily drawn back into the conflict they
escaped.77
The use of children in armed conflict is rampant in almost every
substantial military conflict in the world.7 8 Groups that use child soldiers
include those that are government-supported, as well as rebel groups
within war-torn countries. 79 The conflicts in which children are used
tend to be located in areas with limited resources and in regions
contained within political boundaries.
80
Some countries, such as Afghanistan, have seen seemingly
unending armed conflict where children were used as soldiers. 81 In
Colombia, tens of thousands of children have been forced into service,
82
some as young as eight. 83 Girls in Uganda are forced not only to fight
but also to be sex slaves.84 Nearly one-third of the child soldiers used in
conflicts in El Salvador, Uganda, and Ethiopia are girls.85 The use of
child soldiers in Asia, South America, the Middle East, and Europe
makes it clear that the problem is not limited to any one region of the
world. 86
Although child conscription is a serious issue throughout the world,
the problem is especially prevalent in Africa. In Africa, as many as
100,000 children are currently participating in armed conflicts.87 The
United Nations ("UN") has singled out four African countries for the
high number of child soldiers being used there: Burundi, Liberia,
Somalia, and the Congo. 88 The UN has made it clear that, while
AFR620342003ENGLISH/$File/AFR6203403.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty International].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Udombana, supra note 25, at 60.
75. See Amnesty International, supra note 71.
76. Id.
77. See Becker, supra note 22, at 16.
78. Id.
79. See Fact Sheet, supra note 17.
80. Id.
81. See Hearings, supra note 21.
82. See Human Rights Watch, Little Bells and Little Bees: The Forced Recruitment
of Children, in War Without Quarter, Columbia and International Humanitarian Law
(1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/colombia/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Becker, supra note 22, at 18.
86. See Fact Sheet, supra note 17.
87. Id.
88. See Udombana, supra note 25, at 62.
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prevalent throughout the world, Africa requires special attention in order
to address the child conscription problem.
89
B. Child Conscription in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Amnesty International reports the Congo as "one of the countries of
the world with the largest number of child soldiers." 90  Economic, 91
social,92 and political factors have contributed to the high use of child
soldiers there.93 In the Congo, the average income is barely one dollar
per day.94 Additionally, children make up a high percentage of the
Congolese population.95 Militias find children under the age of fifteen to
be an especially prime group from which to obtain soldiers because they
make up roughly forty-seven percent of the total Congolese population.96
A lack of education on the part of the general public in the Congo
concerning the use of children in armed conflicts also contributes to their
use.97  Most Congolese do not understand that the international
community considers using children to fight in military conflicts a war
crime.98  Children who have fought in some of the conflicts are
considered military heroes who were fighting against "external
aggressors." 99 Mostly, any charges against militiamen who have used
child soldiers are met with surprise because people in the Congo are
unaware it is a war crime.100
The Congo has been ravaged by a succession of wars,' which have
lead to a large loss of military personnel and created a need for more
soldiers. 10 2 Many military groups have been involved in conflicts since
1996103 and each has used child soldiers. 0 4 Watch List reports .that the
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
("AFDL"), a multi-ethnic group composed of out-of-state factions,
abducted thousands of children while they were "coming home from
89. Id.
90. Amnesty International, supra note 71, at 1.
91. See REDRESS, supra note 1, at 7.
92. Id.
93. See Amnesty International, supra note 71, at 28.




98. See id. at 18.
99. See REDRESS, supra note 1, at 18.
100. Id. at 22.
101. See id. at 17.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 18.
104. See REDRESS, supra note 1, at 18.
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school, church, the market place '105 and from refugee and internally
displaced person camps. 1
06
Throughout many wars in the Congo, children have made up a high
percentage of all militants used in combat.'0 7 It is estimated that children
accounted for up to seventy percent of military personnel in some
groups.108  The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie
(Congolese Gathering for Democracy) used children to make up thirty-
five to forty percent of their armed forces. 109 Nearly 10,000 children
were used by the AFDL in the 1996 opposition to the Mobutu. 1° Some
groups used children to make up over fifty percent of their ranks."'
These military groups included the Union of Congolese Patriots
("UPC"), which was commanded by Thomas Lubanga.112
The experience for children conscripted in the Congo is as appalling
as in other regions. They are initiated into the ranks, sometimes through
a "welcoming ceremony."' 13 One observer to such a ceremony explained
how the young girls would be "hand picked at the ceremony by the
commanders and other high-ranking soldiers as their 'wives."")114 The
young soldiers are put through rituals, including "magical rites" where
the children are forced to use drugs and are convinced that bullets cannot
harm them." 5
The situation in the Congo has not improved in recent years. In
2002, the Joint Army Commission of the UN ("Joint Commission")
obtained lists of all combatants involved in the warfare during
negotiations." 6 At that time, children accounted for fifty percent of the
350,000 total soldiers being used. 1 7 Of that high percentage of children,
it was estimated by the Joint Commission that "10% were under 12, 30%
were between 12-15 and 20% were between 16-18."118 Furthermore, the
UN Mission in the Congo ("MONUC") determined there were still
nearly thirty thousand child soldiers being used in 2004.19 As a result of
using such young combatants in these conflicts, MONUC reports "tens
105. Id.
106. See id. at 19.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See REDRESS, supra note 1, at 21.









119. See REDRESS, supra note 1, at 19.
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of thousands of women have been raped. Countless acts of torture have
been reported. Fleeing the conflict, hundreds of thousands of civilians
have been driven from their home" to flee the violence.
1 20
C. International Law and Child Conscription
The international community has viewed child conscription as
immoral and illegal for many years. As far back as 1924 there has been
an international focus on children's rights. 12 At that time, the League of
Nations approved the Declaration of the Rights of the Child
("Declaration") in response to the violence that many children suffered
during the First World War. 122 However, the Declaration did not address
the use of children in warfare explicitly.
123
Greater international attention has been focused on child
conscription since the approval of the Declaration in an attempt to
protect children. Although the Geneva Convention of 1949 did not
specifically address the use of child soldiers, later actions by the UN
did.124 In 2000, the UN adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child ("Optional Protocol"). 125  The Optional
Protocol made the use of soldiers under the age of eighteen expressly
illegal. 126 Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
27
provides that "violations of customary international law and human
morality result whether children become soldiers voluntarily or as a
result of forced recruitment."'
' 28
The Optional Protocol creates a positive obligation on the part of
countries to not recruit children who are younger than eighteen, and
decline children who "voluntarily" seek to enlist. 129  The Optional
Protocol also takes a very stringent position towards non-state
participants. 30 Non-state participants are groups that are not a part of
any states' armed forces.' 3 ' The Optional Protocol proclaims that these
groups "should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities
120. Amnesty International, supra note 71, at 1.
121. See Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, Sept. 26, 1924,
League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 21 at 43 (1924).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 49 preamble, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter Convention].
125. See Optional Protocol, supra note 14.
126. Id.
127. See Convention, supra note 126.
128. Id.
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persons under the age of [eighteen] years."'1
32
Additionally, numerous international organizations have taken steps
to prevent the use of child soldiers. In 1999, the International Labour
Organization ("ILO") defined child conscription as "one of the worst
forms of child labour"'1 33 and forbade the "forced or compulsory
recruitment of children under the age of [eighteen] for use in armed
conflict."'1 34 The ILO views the involvement of children in warfare, both
forcibly and voluntarily, as more "hazardous and injurious" than any
other form of child labor.' 
35
Regional affiliations have taken steps to decrease the use of child
soldiers. In Africa, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child of 1999 ("Charter") made eighteen the minimum age of
conscription. 136 The Charter, using the Optional Protocol as a guide,
137
requires signatories to take steps that will "ensure that no child shall take
a direct part in hostilities."' 38 Even though the Charter allows children to
be used in support functions, 39 it specifically calls for countries to avoid
"recruiting any child."'140  That provision of the Charter is meant to
include both forced and willful recruitment.14 1  Since the Charter is
considered a "human rights treaty," 142 it applies to the recruitment of
children in times of peace as well as during war.
143
D. The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court
The UN has created further avenues to combat child conscription.
The UN has established the use of child soldiers as a war crime through
the Rome Statute (1998).144 One hundred and four countries have signed
the Rome Statute, including the Congo. 145 However a few countries,
such as the United States, 146 undermine the ICC's authority by refusing
132. Id.
133. Security Council Briefing, supra note 32, at 3.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990, art.
22(2) [hereinafter African Charter] (the Charter entered into force on Nov. 29, 1999).
137. See REDRESS, supra note 1, at 25.
138. African Charter, supra note 136, at art. 22(2).
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See REDRESS, supra note 1, at 25.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, at art. 8.2(a)(xxvi).
145. See International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter State Parties].
146. See Robert C. Johansen, JOAN B. KROC INST FOR INT'L PEACE STUDIES, U.S.
Opposition to the International Criminal Court: Unfounded Fears, Policy Brief #7,
(2001), available at http://www.nd.edu/-krocinst/polbriefs/pbrief7.shtml (last visited
[Vol. 26:3
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to sign the Rome Statute.
47
The non-signing countries, including the United States, have several
concerns with regards to the court. 48 The United States is concerned
that the Rome Statute would provide for the trial of Americans by the
ICC, which would challenge the United States' sovereignty. 49
Regardless of the reasons for not signing the Rome Statute, the ICC will
struggle to gain legitimacy so long as major players on the international
stage remain non-committal. 15°
The Rome Statute specifically makes the "conscripting or enlisting
of children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces
or using them to participate actively in hostilities" a war crime.'
51
Additionally, the Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute
war crimes of this nature.
152
Prosecutions of war crimes in the ICC, including child conscription,
are not typically initiated through victims or local officials. 53  The
processes for pressing charges are set out in the Rome Statute under
Article 13,154 which allows three parties to initiate the prosecution of war
crimes. 155 State parties and the UN Security Council can refer matters to
the ICC prosecutor for investigation 156 and the prosecutor can initiate an
investigation based on information he has received. 157 However, cases
may only be initiated for crimes that have occurred since the date of the
Court's inception in 2002.158 Furthermore, the ICC operates on the
principle of "complementarity,' 59 which holds that the court will not act
unless a governmental body "lacks either the will or the capacity to
prosecute a crime committed within its jurisdiction."'1
60
There have been four referrals to the ICC since its creation.1
61
Uganda, 162 the Congo, 163 and the Central African Republic' 64 referred
Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Kroc Institute].
147. See id.
148. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 9.
149. Id.
150. See generally Kroc Institute, supra note 146.
151. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, at art. 8.2(a)(xxvi).
152. See id. at art. 5.
153. See REDRESS, supra note 1, at 8.









163. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 9.
164. Id.
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circumstances that had occurred within their borders. The UN Security
Council referred the matter of Darfur, Sudan to the ICC.165 Within the
last year two possible cases were dismissed, 166 and five other "situations"
are currently being investigated.
167
III. The ICC's First Case: The Prosecutor v. Lubanga
A. Lubanga and Child Conscription in the Congo
The ICC began investigating the situation in the Congo upon
referral by the Congolese government. 168 Specifically, the court began to
focus on the war crime of child conscription in connection with its civil
war. 169 In February 2006, the ICC prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for
war leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.1 70  The warrant charges Lubanga
with recruiting children, age fifteen and under, to fight in his militia
during the civil war.' 71  By March, the Congolese government
surrendered him to international authorities.1 72  A hearing began in
November to decide if the case will continue to a full trial.
173
Lubanga led the military group Union des Patriotes Congolais
("UPC") in the northeast of the country during the civil war.
174
Reportedly, Lubanga issued a command that "every family contribute a
cow, a goat[,] or a child to the resistance effort."' 175 In November 2002,
Lubanga led the UPC when they purportedly recruited an entire fifth
grade class from a school in Mudzi Pela, Ituri to serve in his military. 76
The US State Department reports that at one-point children made up
close to fifty percent of the soldiers under Lubanga's control.
177
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ICC last year).
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B. Analysis of the ICC's First Case
Several avenues of criticism are leveled at the ICC for its trial
against Lubanga. One such criticism is a lack of communication. 178 The
lack of education about child conscription in the war-torn areas, such as
the Congo 179 requires a greater level of communication from the
international community. 18  Communication continues to be difficult in
the Congo due to sustained warfare.181 Where the trial will take place in
the Hague, a substantial distance from the Congo, there is increased
difficulty in communicating the nature of the trial to the Congolese
people. 182  In turn, any lapse in communication hinders the deterrent
effect of the ICC's trial.1
83
Deterrence is an important function of the ICC. International
organizations, such as Amnesty International, assert that "with
international support and cooperation the court will help to deter the
most horrific crimes by ensuring that those responsible will be brought to
justice either in the [c]ourt or, under the principle of complementarity, in
national courts. 184 This theory assumes that awareness of high profile
cases, such as Lubanga's, will be communicated throughout the
country. 185  However, communicating information with individuals in
unstable regions of the world, such as the Congo, is difficult. If the
Congolese people, and others in the world, are informed of Lubanga's
prosecution, then this case will succeed in creating awareness of the
crime of child conscription. 186
The issue of sovereignty continues to be a major question
concerning the court. 187 However, proponents of the court argue the ICC
will not supersede the authority of any country.188 Article 17 of the
178. See Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo and the International
Criminal Court Hearing to Confirm the Charges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; Q & A,
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/lubangaqna1106/index.htm#_Toc 150247023 (last
visited Mar. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Q & A].
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Rome Statute provides each nation's court with original jurisdiction.' 89
The principle of complementarity' 90 allows the ICC to act only if it is
clear the crime will not be prosecuted through any other means. 191 Thus,
local courts must either take action or not in the first instance.
92
Additionally, nations must first agree to the Rome Statute in order for the
court to have jurisdiction over them. 93 The Congo is a signatory to the
Rome Statute' 94 and is responsible for the instigation of the ICC's
involvement, so in Lubanga's case sovereignty is not a concern.
95
Several countries in Africa, including the Congo, have not
implemented the Rome Statute's provisions into their laws, despite
ratifying the Statute.' 96 By not implementing the Statute's provisions,
countries run the risk of creating greater need for ICC intervention.'
97
This brings international authority in where a country's own courts may
have been unable to deal with a situation effectively. 198 As noted above,
the Congolese government sought the ICC's involvement in Lubanga's
case, so their failure to implement the Rome Statute's provisions has no
effect.' 99
Another concern surrounding the case is the limited nature of the
charges against Lubanga. 200  The charges do not include rape or
torture.2°' Citizens in the Congo have suffered years of rape, murder,
and torture, as well as the destruction of property.2 °2 Therefore, it is very
difficult for the Congolese people to comprehend that child conscription
is the only, or even most serious, crime committed.20 3  Several
organizations assert that by not including other serious crimes, the court
is conveying the idea that those who commit such crimes will not be
punished.2 °4
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The prosecution's choice of charges has been attributed to
prosecutorial strategy. °5 The strategy focuses on individual crimes and
keeps the trials shorter and more efficient.20 6 Furthermore, prosecutors
are still committed to bringing other charges in other proceedings.2 7 As
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, explained in an ICC
Newsletter, "this does not exclude the continuation of investigations into
other crimes allegedly committed by Mr. Lubanga Dyilo after the current
proceedings are closed. 20 8
Prosecutors also hope to increase awareness about child
conscription by focusing on it before prosecuting Lubanga for other
209crimes. °  Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda described child
conscription as "one of the least-reported crimes that is happening
globally, and of course the least punished. 210  By focusing on child
conscription, the ICC's prosecutors have ensured that the people of the
Congo will become aware that it is indeed a war crime to use children in
warfare. Moreover, if the child conscription charges had been included
in a set of several charges leveled against Lubanga, there would be
substantial risk that the conscription charge would be overshadowed and
have little deterrent effect.
Another troublesome aspect of this case is that the ICC may not be
the most appropriate or convenient forum in which to bring these
211charges. This principle is generally known as forum non conveniens.
A forum may be inappropriate for several reasons, including the
unavailability of witnesses212 and the inability to obtain physical
evidence.213
Signs the ICC may not be the appropriate forum for this case
already exist. The trial has seen postponements due, as Chief Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo explains, to the fact that violence in the Congo has
meant, "the safety of witnesses and victims could not be guaranteed. 214
the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, (July 31, 2006), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/01/congol3891.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2008)
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Furthermore, the ICC is located at The Hague, in the Netherlands. 2 5
This location has caused investigative, procedural, and logistical burdens
on both the prosecution and defense because of the distance between the
court and the country where the crime took place.21 6
The ICC loses other advantages by not having the trial in the
Congo. As Professor Antonio Cassese 21 7 notes in "International Criminal
Law," local trials "[expose] the local population to past atrocities, with
the two fold advantage of making everybody cognizant of those
atrocities, including those who sided with the perpetrators. 218 In other
words, a local trial would contribute to the court's deterrent ability.
The prosecution seems to be dealing indirectly with the issue of
forum non conveniens by focusing on one charge at a time. 219 By doing
so, Ocampo claims there will be shorter trials, which "will also mean the
more efficient use of resources., 2 0  He further explains this approach
will "contribute to limiting the number of witnesses needed for each
trial. 221
There are other important reasons for not holding the trial in the
Congo. In a neutral setting, such as the Hague, security is far less
difficult to ensure. In the Congo, as in other conflict zones, it is difficult
to ensure the security of important players in the judicial process.222
Prosecution and defense counsel, court staff, and trial witnesses could be
at risk of death or bodily injury during any proceeding held there.223 This
danger could lead to a breakdown of judicial process at its core.224
Furthermore, the risks involved with participating in the trial may even
discourage important witnesses from coming forward.
As in Uganda, the Court's actions could aggravate the current
conflict and frustrate the ongoing peace process. 5 In Uganda, the ICC
is investigating charges against military leader Joseph Kony.226 These
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217. Former Judge and President of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia.
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219. See Newsletter, supra note 205, at 2.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See CASSESE, supra note 218, at 344.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 346 ("[I]t is obvious that the dangers following hatred, resentment, and
social conflict festering in those countries may pose a serious risk to those working in the
judicial process.").
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(Ghana), Jan. 10, 2007, available at http://www.thestatesmanonline.com/pages/
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charges include child conscription, mass murder, and acts of sexual
violence. 227  Recently, the opposing parties in the Ugandan conflict
attempted to establish a peace agreement in which Kony sought
immunity from any criminal charges in Uganda and international
228courts. 8 In light of Kony's demands and despite requesting the ICC's
involvment, the Ugandan government asked the ICC to back off.229 The
Ugandan government believes the peace process is more important than
any criminal trials and by further pursuing the charges the ICC is
threatening their chances of obtaining peace.23°
Others, like Cassese, assert these cases will have the opposite effect
than what has been seen in Uganda.23' Cassese notes that by, "bringing
to trial those responsible for serious crimes [the] post-conflict peace-
building process" will be assisted.232  Furthermore, he argues
reconciliation is better served by prosecuting these crimes.233 Despite the
problems in Uganda, the ICC has not faced similar problems in
Lubanga's case. However, the way in which the ICC handles Uganda's
situation my have an indirect effect on the court's legitimacy that could
have consequences in the prosecution of Lubanga.
C. Going Forward
The prosecution must stay true to its commitment to prosecute all of
the gravest crimes committed by Lubanga, including torture and
murder.234 To address the concerns surrounding the limited focus of this
trial, the prosecution should amend the charges to include those
associated with the sexual violence committed against the conscripted
children.235 By adding these charges the prosecution would assert that
child conscription and sexual crimes, such as sexual enslavement, often
coexist and neither will be tolerated. Judicial efficiency would be served
because much of the same evidence and witnesses would be used for
each of these crimes.236
There continues to be a need for international pressure in order to
get non-participating countries to agree to the Rome Statute, especially
the United States. However, international pressure must also be brought
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neglected to implement the Statute's requirements.2 37 If those State
parties ratify the Rome Statute's provisions into their own laws they
would strengthen their domestic prosecutions. In turn, ratification would
lead to domestic prosecution of war crimes such as child conscription.238
Thus, the need for ICC intervention within their borders would be
reduced.239
Giving into concerns for the peace process will only undermine the
court's authority and weaken its deterrent effect. 240 The court must
continue to prosecute conscription cases, even in the face of opposition
from the host country, in order to make it clear that perpetrators will not
go unpunished. 241  This is especially true when the situation was
recommended to the court by the host country, then later resisted by that
same country (as the Ugandan situation demonstrates).242 Criminal
actors' attempts to negotiate away their culpability in the name of
peace243 further demonstrates there is great need for the ICC to stay
committed to its mission and ensure that war crimes will not be
tolerated.244
The ICC must also ensure strong lines of communication with the
Congo concerning various aspects of the case. This may require that live
press conferences from The Hague to the Congo be presented and that
other forms of communication are made readily available in a way that
can be accessed by the Congolese people. 245  Any form of
communication would be proper so long as it reaches individuals in the
Congo and increases awareness of the trial.
IV. Conclusion
While there are legitimate concerns surrounding the ICC, the
positives in this case outweigh any apprehensions. If the prosecution of
Lubanga had been left to the Congolese government, the charge of child
conscription may have been buried amongst a plethora of other charges
or forgotten entirely. These dangers are especially true where the
Congolese people have little understanding of the crime of child
conscription. By making child conscription the centerpiece of their first
case, the ICC has ensured that awareness of the crime of child
conscription will be increased, not only in the Congo, but also
237. See Bekou & Shah, supra note 196, at 509.
238. Id.
239. Id.




244. See Rome Statute, supra note 13, at pmbl.
245. See Q & A, supra note 178, at 6.
[Vol. 26:3
2008] SHOWING ITS TEETH 785
throughout the world. Increased awareness will likely have a substantial
affect in deterring future violations of this crime.
Child conscription is an under-prosecuted war crime that affects the
most vulnerable individuals on our planet: children. As such, the ICC
prosecutors should be commended for taking action where so often the
world has turned its back. It is important that the ICC follow through
with this case despite the hurdles it must overcome in prosecuting it. Let
this case stand as an example to those who would use children as
weapons, that the international community will not tolerate such action.

